Impediments to International Cooperation against Terrorism

Introduction

International cooperation is crucial to the counterterrorism strategy. Collaboration among nations works to deny safe havens to those who commit or attempt to commit terrorist acts. Moreover, the partnership ensures the sharing of intelligence on terrorism, which helps track down, deter attacks, and initiate arrests. Cooperation also works to harmonize laws and regulations around terrorism on issues such as financing, data, and arrests. During the United Nation’s 73rd session, international terrorism dominated the topic (UN, 2018). Speakers stressed on international and regional collaboration. For example, Venezuela’s delegate called for the adoption of Code Conduct as it would greatly aid international cooperation while the Kenyan delegation called for the strengthening of the nation’s ability to address threats failure to which the challenges is multiplied (confused by the wording) (UN, 2018). However, there exist several barriers in regards to international cooperation and the benefits it promises to offer on fighting terrorism. This paper describes obstacles to international cooperation against terrorism and assesses measures that can curb these impediments.

Financing

Money is the lifeblood of terrorism. Terrorism draws its finance from global sources, which means the money has to be transacted through various countries. Disrupting this flow of funds to terrorists is essential to any anti-terrorism campaign. This disruption is dependent on international cooperation, which is had to come by (source).

Lack of international cooperation is informed by the fact that not all nations are willing or prepared to disrupt the flow of the monies since they do not share the same notion of “terrorist financing.” Some countries are reluctant to initiate a freeze and seize strategy against terrorist funds as they might not meet their definition of such funds (source). This shortcoming is attributed to the culture of the countries, as is the case in the Middle East. For example, the Islamic religion requires that Muslims give money to charities. Zakat (tithing) forms one of the five pillars of Islam. While charity, donations, and almsgiving are arbitrary actions, Zakat is a formal duty not subject to choice. Islam obliges believers to disburse 2.5 percent of their wealth as Zakat. Given that this is a fundamental precept of Islam, most Muslim-majority countries would turn a blind eye to those giving and charity groups receiving Zakat (Baghat, 2004). This shortcoming is also evidenced by the continued presence of “pocket jihad,” which is an Islamic tradition that commands a Muslim to fight jihad with his tongue, soul, and money (Bar, 2008).  This makes financial contributions to jihad religiously important, and though policies have denounced the tradition, convincing Muslim clerics to condemn donation of money to jihad has not been successful.

Economic problems have also been highlighted as a barrier to international cooperation in fighting terrorism. States such as the United Arab Emirates and the Cayman Islands advertise themselves as having laws and banking practices that permit financial secrecy. This allows them to boost their gross domestic product by the large amount of business that their culture of financial secrecy attracts. For businesses sympathizing with terrorism or operated by terrorists, exploiting such gaps is relatively easy. Following the September 11th attacks, the U.S. accused Saudi Arabia of not doing enough to crack down on terrorism financing and money laundering. In response, Saudi Arabia pointed at the presence of approximately six million laborers in their country who sent billions of dollars out of the country every year and that Saudis themselves held extensive investments abroad (Bar, 2008).  Saudi Arabia proceeded to admit that preventing the money leaving the country from finding its way to Al-Qaeda was a virtually impossible task (Baghat, 2004). Such economic realities between member states make it difficult for nations to fully prevent terrorism financing.

Proposed Solution: Financing

International countries in partnership to fight terrorism should have a harmonized concept of “terrorism financing.” This will allow nations, especially the Muslim-majority states, to denounce acts such as “pocket jihad” and to follow up institutions collecting Zakat closely (Bar, 2008).  The concept should take into consideration traditional Islamic practices and should avoid initiating conflict with them. Muslim scholars and clerics should also be encouraged to denounce “pocket jihad.” This allows countries such as Libya, which continue to suffer under terrorism, to receive international support.

To counter weakness in international cooperation on terrorism financing, nations need to harmonize laws on money laundering. Member states should be bound by law to freeze funds and other financial assets associated with terrorism. The member states should also be responsible for disrupting terrorism-financing activities in the countries. The laws should also be extended to countries with financial secrecy laws.

State Sponsors of Terrorism

The presence of state sponsors of terrorism continues to impact international cooperation as a counterterrorism strategy. Countries are often labeled “State Sponsors of Terrorism” by the United States Department of State if the department deems they have continually supported for acts of terrorism. States that are included on the list are slapped with strict unilateral sanctions. Some of the countries that have been designated as state sponsors include Libya, Iraq, Syria, North Korea, and Iran (Bar, 2008).  

Iran was designated “State Sponsors of Terrorism” in 1984 for backing Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza. As recently as 2006, Iran was also accused of offering weapons, training, and funding to Hamas and rearming Hezbollah, which violated the United Nation’s Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 (Bar, 2008).  Sudan was designated “State Sponsors of Terrorism” in 1993 for hosting Al Qaeda within its terrorist (? Are you sure you meant within its terrorist?). Moreover, until 2015, the country continued to host Iranians. Syria entered the list in 1979 when the U.S. accused the Assad regime of continued political support of terrorist groups (Bar, 2008).

While sanctions have served to curtail “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” this strategy does not seem to be effective. Some states view the designation as U.S. creation rather than a counterterrorism strategy. Put differently; the designation is viewed as a bid by the U.S. to pursue its interests. While U.S. allies recognize the sanctions and desist from trading with “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” some nations ignore the sanctions. China and Russia feature as some of the countries that continue to uphold relations with listed countries. For example, China, which has grown dependent on oil imports, depend on Iran to fulfill this need. Moreover, listed countries offer support to each other, as evidenced by the close relationship between Iran, Syria, and North Korea. For example, Iran has continued to purchase missiles from Iran. This reciprocation of shared enmity is a barrier to international cooperation on terrorism (source).

Solution: State Sponsors of Terrorism

To counter the effect of “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” there is a need to negotiate with them. Gottlieb (2013) observed that it was challenging to engage listed countries militarily since some are nuclear-armed, and their military capability is also high. Gottlieb highlights the case of North Korea, which after a “six-party talk” involving the U.S., Japan, South Korea, China, and North Korea, dismantled its Yongbyon nuclear reactor. Gottlieb argued that while traditionally diplomacy did not guarantee wholesale behavioral changes on the part of the “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” it offered the possibility of small victories one at a time.   

Soft power approaches such as sanctions are still effective in countering “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” This assertion is supported by Gottlieb (2013), who observed Sudan and Libya as countries that cooperated after they sanctioned. After the UN Security Council and the U.S. placed sanctions against Sudan. Gottlieb observed that Sudan became cooperative with the U.S. and worked actively to counter Al Qaeda’s operations in the country, a move that saw the sanction lifted.

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Intelligence Sharing

One of the impediments to international cooperation is the fragmentation of intelligence agencies in Member states and their unwillingness to share information. Deutch and Smith (2002) identified 13 intelligence agencies other than the Department of Defense (DOD). The authors pointed out that the FBI was unwilling to share with other government agencies the information it had gotten from its informants for fear that the move would compromise future court actions. On the other hand, Deutch and Smith, highlight that the CIA was also unwilling to give FBI information it had gotten from its agents for fear that its sources and method of obtaining the information would be exposed in court. The lack of a synchronized or unified intelligence agency and information sharing procedure means that achieving international cooperation on counterterrorism is difficult.

International intelligence sharing is affected by the fact that there exists a difference in how countries perceive a threat. A country that views itself as not affected by terrorism attacks such as Sudan would be unwilling to share intelligence information despite hosting Al Qaeda operatives. Gottlieb (2013) argued that in the 1990s, Sudan refused to arrange for U.S. agents to arrest Osama bin Laden and was unwilling to counter transnational terrorism. This could have stemmed from Sudan’s inability to perceive Al Qaeda as a threat.

Legal barriers in a country may also prevent intelligence cooperation on intelligence sharing. For example, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) can only enter into a cooperation arrangement with foreign intelligence only by approval by the Solicitor General of Canada. The Solicitor-General must also consult the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Moreover, the Solicitor General may enact requirements on any arrangement and must guarantee that the human rights record of a potential nation is healthy (ODIHR, 2017. This requirement can be a barrier to international cooperation, given that most of the Middle Eastern countries hosting terrorists or affected by terrorism have worse human rights records.

The fear of misuse or poor handling by intelligence information also impedes international cooperation on intelligence sharing. The intelligence exchange to partners could potentially be used for an unintended purpose. This is exemplified by the 1981 bombing of Iraq’s Osirak reactor by Israel following satellite imagery they had acquired from the CIA (Keatinge et al., 2018). The poor handling of intelligence also poses a threat to partnership and stems from the inability of a state to safe guard the information or the carelessness of intelligence officers. Poor handling can leak information to the general public or the third party without the consent of the originator. One of the most detrimental cases can be traced to the leak of the National Security Agency (NSA) memorandum on intelligence collection of signals against member states of the UNSC (Keatinge et al., 2018). A female employee was charged in 2003 under the Officials Secrets Act for the leak. The leak created a rift between Western nations at a critical time though it was later resolved.

Solution: Intelligence Sharing

There is a need for international cooperation on intelligence gathering and sharing. Gottlieb (2013) reiterates a need for “coordinating interstate cooperation in intelligence gathering and synthesis and by synchronizing state’s individual tactical response to terrorism” (p. 276). Gottlieb also reasons that the UN could engage in state capacity building might in intelligence. That is, helping states build actionable counterterrorism intelligence. Gottlieb offers the possibility of a UN clearinghouse for intelligence gathering by its member states, which would easily be achieved without having to create new UN intelligence assets. This would help counter the mistrust around intelligence sharing.

Countries should also work to unify their intelligence agencies to avoid fragmentation. They should ensure duplication of intelligence gathering is curbed through personnel exchanges and joint training. In an era where national security must be a priority, Deutch and Smith (2002) argue that there should be a single National Counterterrorism Center. The authors reason that this center would plan collecting intelligence from all agencies and producing analysis derived from several sources. Unifying intelligence agencies in a country would also ensure that agreements with foreign counterpart organizations is synchronized. The central agency would also monitor, plan, and approve agreements between internal agencies and their foreign partners on all intelligence matters. This would be useful in ensuring that international cooperation on intelligence gathering and sharing works fluidly.

Extradition

One of the barriers to international cooperation on terrorism is the lack of well-defined processes and procedures for extradition. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2007) defined extradition as an official practice in which a state surrenders a person to another state for purposes of punishment or prosecution for crimes committed in the requesting state’s jurisdiction. Over the years, extradition has come to play an essential role in prosecuting individuals involved in transnational criminal activities, such as cybercrime, terrorism, counterfeiting, and drug trafficking.

International cooperation on extradition is supported by the fact that nations must have a bilateral or multilateral treaty. Most treaties adopt the approach of “dual criminality,” where cases that are extraditable tend to be crimes that carry a punishment of in both jurisdictions (Keatinge et al., 2018). Most treaties also omit the obligation to extradite persons on the grounds of political or military offenses.

However, the extradition of terrorists whom the U.S. and other Western nations are eager to prosecute has, in the recent past, been faced by several obstacles. States, even those in treaties with the U.S., have defied the call for the extradition of terrorists on several grounds. ODIHR (2007) observed that under modern international law, no common rule obligated states to prosecute or extradite a supposed offender who hides in their territory. Additionally, ODIHR noted that a country could refuse extradition on the grounds that the individual will not receive a fair trial. Moreover, a country may refuse extradition if there is a possibility of capital punishment. This is particularly so for countries that have abolished capital punishment. These countries will refuse to extradite if the individual is likely to face a death penalty in the requesting country. In other cases, a country may turn down the request if the criminals or citizens are their own citizens.

Solution: Extradition

States should take giant strides towards enacting laws around extradition. This will be important to ensure that the prosecution of persons involved in international terrorism is achieved. Nations should amend their laws to allow their citizens to be extradited. In case such amendments face difficulties, nations can arrange for their nation to be extradited for trial abroad on condition the convicted terrorist will serve their sentence in their home country (Keatinge et al., 2018).

Extradition treaties between states should also clarify on capital punishment. In order to overcome the challenges imposed by the death penalty, treaties should provide an adequate assurance that the death penalty, even if imposed, would not be carried out. States that still uphold the death penalty could also take advantage of the presidential pardons or mercy available in the legal systems to commute the death sentence on extradited persons to life imprisonment.

In cases where states refuse entirely to extradite a terrorist, the refusing state should be subjected to the principle of aut dedere aut judicare (Keatinge et al., 2018).The principle gives the state two options, to either extradite or prosecute the accused individuals. The state should proceed and prosecute the individual if sufficient evidence has been given by the requesting state.

Lack of Resources in Developing Countries

Developing countries are characterized by high levels of poverty and lack of resources. Fighting terrorism would require that these nations divert resources normally allocated to social and economic programs and sectors such as health, education, sanitation, and water. Weak states that would turn their resources to fighting terrorism deny the general population services, which can, in turn, amplify willingness by individuals to join violent extremist (Source).

Weak states are also characterized by a lack of control over their territory. These ungoverned territories act as a communication hub, training grounds, storehouse, and places to evade counterterrorism. The porous borders in these countries also facilitate trafficking in and transshipment of weapons, people, narcotics, laundered money, and other contraband. Moreover, high levels of corruption in these countries, coupled with a weak rule of law also ensures the survival of terrorists (Source). This is through the exploitation of the banking system and easy access to falsified documents.

Counterterrorism may also require military engagement depending on the severity. Military engagement may be necessary where terrorists have acquired territories in a state, as is the case with Al-Shabab in Somalia, ISIS in Iraq, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, among others (Keatinge et al., 2018). In these cases, the countries need to dedicate resources to engaging terrorists which can be very expensive. Moreover, their military capability may lack in areas such as logistics and armament. These countries may also not engage in target attacks using drones since they do not have them.

Given that poor states are also characterized by weak institutions, this would also inhibit them from getting into mutual agreements with other nations on intelligence sharing. This assertion is informed by the fact that weak institutions lack the necessary expertise to keep information secure. Moreover, infiltration by terrorist or terrorist sympathizers into security institutions means that information would easily reach terrorists or third parties.

For most developing countries, the situation is further complicated by the adoption of sophisticated technology by terrorists. Keatinge, Carlisle, and Keen (2018) highlighted the possibility by terrorists to use digital currencies, which have features that pose risks for facilitating criminality such as terrorist financing and money laundering. Keatinge et al. (2018), whose policy recommendation examine the European continent’s ability to curb the use of virtual currencies by terrorists, noted that Europol’s European Cybercrime Center (EC3) had made huge strides on the sector. The authors pinpoint that the center had developed digital forensic capabilities and supported counter-cybercrime operations across the EU. While developed nations enjoy expertise and resources that can be directed to upcoming challenges such as cybercrime, the reality is different for developing countries. To most developing countries, these risks are almost non-existent, even when terrorists continue to exploit them.

The challenges experienced by developing nations from poor governance, lack of military capability, and cybercrime expertise, too weak institutions- mean that international cooperation on terrorism is not possible. Cooperation would be impossible if some partners lack resources and do not prioritize counterterrorism as a national agenda.

Solution: Lack of Resources in Developing Countries

Developing countries could be assisted in improving their governance if they are to prioritize counterterrorism and cooperate with other states. This assistance could be in the form of aid directed in helping the countries expand their administration and offer basic services to their population. Moreover, helping them strengthen their institutions and civil societies, ensures that accountability for aid funds is enhanced. In offering aid, development agencies such as the US Agency for International Aid (USAID), and the World Bank, among others, should focus not only on the central institutions but also on community-based development. This helps supplement the efforts of charities and social welfare societies, most of which are moderate institutions

Another option would be to improve these countries’ capability to fight terrorism directly. This could be achieved by offering them direct military assistance. Moreover, overhauling their armed forces by introducing reforms, training soldiers, and issuing new weapons and equipment would help them counter-terrorists. The military assistance could be extended by directing their large combat formations and directing air and artillery strikes during complex operations. International organizations could also train developing nations on intelligence gathering, storage, and sharing. Moreover, they could be trained on upcoming issues such as how they could counter cybercrime.

Conclusion

The paper finds that international cooperation on terrorism is impeded by several factors. The paper finds that financing, extradition, intelligence gathering and sharing, lack of resources in developing countries, and the presence of “State Sponsors of Terrorism” as major barriers to cooperation. On financing, the paper explains that Muslim culture and differing views on the concept of “terrorism financing” are responsible for the lack of cooperation. The Zakat system, which is a fundamental pillar of Islam, is viewed as a source of terrorism financing by the West, which creates a divide on the issue. The paper also examined the conflict around intelligence and finds that lack of trust between nations and intelligence agencies as responsible for lack of cooperation. This is also the case with extradition where states refuse to extradite for fear of capital punishment and where their nationals are involved. State sponsors of terrorism impede cooperation and form alliances that could further derail counterterrorism efforts. Lastly, the lack of resources in developing countries are a barrier to cooperation as they have other struggles to deal with outside terrorism. The solutions proposed by the paper are likely to help counter the barriers and ensure international cooperation on terrorism is achieved.

References

Bahgat, G. (2004). Saudi Arabia and war on Terrorism. Arab Studies Quarterly, 26(1), 51-63.

Bar, S. (2008). undefined. The Theory and Practice of Islamic Terrorism, 11-20. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230616509_2

Deutch, J., & Smith, J. (2002). Smarter Intelligence. Foreign Policy.

Gottlieb, S. (2013). Debating terrorism and counterterrorism: Conflicting perspectives on causes, contexts, and responses. CQ Press.

Keatinge, T., Carlisle, D., & Keen, F. (2018). Virtual currencies and terrorist financing: Assessing the risks and evaluating responses (PE 604.970). European Parliament: Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights And Constitutional Affairs.

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). (2007). Extradition and Human Rights in the Context of Counterterrorism. OSCE. https://www.osce.org/odihr/24392?download=true

United Nations. (2018, October 4). Cooperation, collaboration between countries crucial in combating international terrorism, sixth committee speakers stress, hailing ‘Code of conduct’. Welcome to the United Nations. https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/gal3567.doc.htm